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RECENT DECISIONS
Trade Regulations: Product Extension Merger: In Federal Trade
Commnn v. Procter & Gamble Co.,' the Supreme Court held that the
Procter & Gamble Company must divest itself of the assets of Clorox
Chemical Company because, as the Commission charged, Procter's acquisition of Clorox may substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in the production and sale of household liquid bleaches. This
2
is a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.

Clorox was the leading manufacturer of household liquid bleach.
Bleach is a distinctive product used as a germicide, disinfectant and
whitening agent in washing clothes and other fabrics. There is no close
substitute. The relevant bleach market is the nation and a series of regional markets, and most manufacturers are limited to competition
within a single region because of high shipping costs and low sales
prices. Clorox is the only firm selling nationally, and its closest competitor, Purex, has its bleach available in less than 50% of the national
market. At the time of the acquisition by Procter & Gamble, Clorox had
48.8% of national sales, while Purex accounted for 15.7% of the
national sales. 3
Procter & Gamble is a large, diversified manufacturer of low price,
high-turnover household products, primarily in the area of soaps and
detergents, and was not a producer of household liquid bleach. Prior to
its acquisition of Clorox, Procter was expanding into product lines related to its basic detergents, and was considering bleach as a possibility
because of its value in washing clothes and fabrics. Procter's promotion
department, however, recommended that Procter purchase Clorox rather
than enter independently. Procter did acquire the assets of Clorox in
exchange for Procter & Gamble stock. The Federal Trade Commission
ordered divestiture but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
Commission. 4 The Supreme Court, subsequently reversed the Court of
Appeals.
The only issue was whether the merger may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly so as to be a violation of section
7 of the Clayton Act. To find a violation of section 7, the Court must
decide whether section 7 covers this type of merger, and whether section
1386 U.S. 568 (1967).
2 No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create
a monopoly, Clayton Act § 7, 38 STAT. 731, as amended, 64 STAT. 1125 (1950),
15 U.S.C. § 18.
3 386 U.S. 568, 571 (1967).
4 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966).
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7 can be used at the merger's incipiency or after the merger is a reality.
The Supreme Court said that section 7 reaches all mergers whether they
are vertical, horizontal, or conglomerate mergers.5 The Court finds authority for this statement in the case of Brown Shoe Company v. United
6
States.
(Congress) hoped to make plain that section 7 applied not only
to mergers between actual competitors, but also to vertical and
conglomerate mergers whose effect may tend to lessen competition
in any line of commerce in any section of the country.'
Now that the Court decided that section 7 covers all mergers, it was
easy to apply it to the merger in this case. The court labelled the CloroxProcter & Gamble merger as a "product-extension" merger when it said:
...this merger is neither horizontal, vertical, nor conglomerate.
Since the products of the acquired company are complementary
to those of the acquiring company and may be produced with
similar facilities, marketed through the same channels and in the
same manner, and advertised by the same media, the Commission
aptly called this acquisition a 'product-extension merger.'"
Once the court has decided that all mergers come under section 7, it
must then decide whether the section can be used before the merger is
effective or after some post-merger evidence is introduced. The legislative history of section 7 convinced the court that "the intent . . . is to

cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before
they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding."9 In the Brown Shoe Co. case, the Court said:
Congress saw the process of concentration in American business
as a dynamic force; it sought to assure the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake this force at its outset
and before it gathered momentum."0
The clear intent of Congress is to stop the anti-competitive practices
before they get started so that an actual finding of anticompetitive practices is not necessary. Instead, to find a section 7 violation, the court
must deal in probabilities and not certainties and must predict "the
merger's impact on competition, present and future,"" without looking
at any post merger evidence.
5 In United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 56, (S.D. N.Y.
1966), the court defines a conglomerate merger as one in which the merged
firms are neither competitors nor potential or actual customers or suppliers
of each other. The merger of competitors constitutes a horizontal merger,
while the union of a firm with a customer or supplier is termed a vertical
merger.
6370 U.S. 294 (1961).
7d. at 317.
s386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
9 S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).
10 Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-318 (1961).
11386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
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In order to predict any anticompetitive tendencies of the merger, the
court must understand the relevant market and whether or not the merger's effect "will substantially lessen competition within the area of
12
effective competition."'
The Court found a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. "The
substitution of the powerful acquiring firm for the smaller, but already
dominant firm may substantially reduce the competitive structure of the
industry by raising entry barriers and by dissuading the smaller firms
from aggressively competing." 13 The Court continued by saying that
the liquid bleach industry was oligopolistic before the merger and Procter's presence would certainly enhance pricing power to make the oligopoly more rigid. 14 Procter was a leader in products complementary to
liquid bleach, and its advantages in management, advertising and manufacturing gave it a position in the liquid bleach industry greater than that
of Clorox. New entrants and even existing competitors will think twice
before competing with Procter & Gamble.
If the court allowed the merger to stand, it would allow the nation's
largest advertiser in 1957,"5 to control a product that depends solely on
advertising as its most competitive weapon. This would tend to create
a monopoly if this power were fully used by Procter in selling liquid
bleach.
The court also found that the merger eliminated Procter as a potential competitor in the liquid bleach industry. It's product lines were
closely related to the bleach industry, and the evidence "clearly shows
that Procter was the most likely entrant."1 6 Procter was in the process
of expanding and diversifying, and liquid bleach was certainly a possibility at the time of the merger.
The Court has done two significant things in this case. In a section
7 violation, no postmerger evidence will be used to prove or disprove
the anticompetitive effects of the merger, and secondly, they have adopted
the same test for all mergers, regardless of name.
The evidence showed that the other producers were selling more
bleach for more money and "that there had been no significant change
in Clorex's market share in the four years subsequent to the merger."' 7
The Court of Appeals weighed this evidence quite heavily in dismissing
the complaint, but the Supreme Court reversed it by merely saying that
the standards were misapprehended in a section 7 proceeding.
Why was the merger struck down? The incipiency theory of section
"2United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 591 (1957).

1 386 U.S. 586, 578 (1967).
14Ibid.
15 Procter spent $80,000,000 on advertising and $47,000,000 on sales promotion in
1957. Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568
(1967).
16

386 U.S. 568, 576 (1967).

17

358 F.2d 74, 80 (6th Cir. 1966).
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7 is the answer. The main purpose of the section 7 is to stop this growth
towards bigness in its incipiency and to foster competition. Congress
does not want to "wait and see" what the effects of the merger may be
before they find a violation of section 7, Clayton Act. If they were to
allow mergers of this kind, and not find a violation until the merger
showed the anticompetitive effects or until the company did use its
power to stifle competition, the entire purpose of the Act would be frustrated.
Thus, the Court has failed to distinguish between the various types
of mergers when applying section 7. It may be a bit inflexible to use one
test for all mergers, but it appears to be the best approach because the
aim of section 7 is to stop anticompetitive effects-the end results of
many mergers. In other words, if the proposed merger will substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, it should be stopped
regardless of the name accorded to it.
MICHAEL J.

O'MELIA

Products Liability: Adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement
of Torts (Second) in Wisconsin.
For products-liability cases we adopt the rule of strict liability in
tort as set forth in sec. 402A of Restatement, 2 Torts(2d),' pp.
347, 348.The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Dippel v. Scianol used these
words in adopting the rule of strict liability in product liability cases.
However, it is questionable if the doctrine of "strict liability," as that
term is used in the Restatement' and elsewhere, was in fact adopted.
The plaintiff in Dippel sought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when the front leg assembly of a large coin-operated
pool table collapsed, traumatically amputating two of his toes. Plaintiff
and two other men, allegedly at the request of and with the consent of
the defendant tavern owner, were moving the pool table to a position
1 Sec. 402 A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
2 37 Wis.2d 443, 459, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63; See also, Monograph, Brief Opposing
Strict Liability In Tort, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (1966).

337 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
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§402A (1965).

